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On the Merit of Equal Pay:
Performance Manipulation and Incentive Setting
BRICE CORGNET, LUDIVINE MARTIN, PEGUY NDODJANG AND ANGELA SUTAN1
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Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of
commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely
assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent
experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is
pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of
incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters
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manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production.
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1. Introduction
The economic literature on incentives puts forward that a key aspect of successful organizations is
their ability to reward each member according to their actual contribution (e.g., Holmström, 1979; 1982;
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Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Doing so, however, requires precise information about individual
achievements which is, often, not readily accessible to managers. Managers must thus partly rely on
organizational members‘ reports of their personal contribution and such reports are likely to be biased
(Prendergast and Topel, 1993). Because presenting oneself in a positive light will typically bring
monetary benefits, organizational members are likely to engage in ‗window-dressing’ activities so as to

AN
US

appear as high contributors. These window-dressing activities consist in making one‘s contribution
appear deceptively favorable. These activities which have been extensively documented in the finance
and accounting literatures (see Lakonishok et al., 1991) typically result from hiding relevant pieces of
information or falsifying documents (Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 1995; Crocker and Morgan, 1998;
Crocker and Slemrod, 2007; Crocker and Gresik, 2011; Beyer et al., 2014; Roger, 2014). In the

M

economics literature on influence costs, window-dressing can also take the form of blatant manipulation
of managers‘ opinions (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988, 1992; Corgnet and Rodriguez-Lara,

ED

2013; Powell, 2015). Regardless of the strategy used to distort performance measures, the organization
will be negatively impacted by these performance manipulation activities as they waste time and distort
incentive schemes (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; 1992). Performance manipulation will reduce the

PT

quality of information available to managers thus ultimately weakening the correlation between
compensation and performance measures (e.g., Holmström, 1979). Performance manipulation is thus

CE

one possible explanation for the surprising limited strength of incentives in actual labor contracts (e.g.,
Baker et al., 1988; Chiappori and Salanié, 2000).

AC

Because performance manipulation can only be effective when hidden from management and because
such activities could be severely punished, it is not surprising that no reliable archival data can be
obtained (Powell, 2015). This prevents the testing of the main conjectures of the different strands of the
literature on performance manipulation which highlight the negative effect of performance manipulation
on organizational performance and the necessity to weaken incentives to prevent such activities. In
particular, one important insight of the influence costs literature is to show that, in the presence of
performance manipulation attempts, it may be optimal for organizations to limit managers‘ discretion
2
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over decisions affecting the distribution of resources. This implies that firms may adopt apparently
wasteful bureaucratic rules (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) for efficiency concerns (Milgrom, 1988;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1988, 1992; Powell, 2015). For example, firms may avoid discrete bonuses to
limit influence activities (Fairburn and Malcomson, 2001). Relatedly, Milgrom and Roberts (1992)
suggested that the extensive use of equal pay may be justified, despite its negative incentive effects, as a
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way to limit influence costs:
―One clear way to limit the competition for rents is to equalize their distribution across potential
competitors, or at least limit the possible differentials. (…) The cost of the policy is that informational
and incentive roles of rewards are muted by closing differentials.‖ (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, page
274).

AN
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Our aim was to collect data to highlight the tradeoff between the positive incentive effect of pay for
performance and its damaging effect on promoting window-dressing. To produce data on performance
manipulation in an organizational context and thus fill the empirical gap in the literature, we created a
laboratory workplace environment in which workers can, instead of completing a real-effort task,
engage in a time-consuming activity that will raise their performance metric. Our aim here was to

M

develop a computerized environment that would incorporate several features of a real-world workplace
in the spirit of early real-effort experiments in the economics literature such as Dickinson (1999) and

ED

van Dijk et al., (2001).

In our setting, workers have to select a performance manipulation option (displayed on their screen) to
exaggerate their actual contribution on the real-effort task. Doing so would freeze their screen for a

PT

duration of 30 seconds during which they could not engage in any activity. The frozen screen aims at
representing the waste of time typically involved in performance manipulation whether it is related to

CE

the falsification of documents or to influence activities. As is described by Milgrom (1988, page 43),
―That time of course is valuable; if it were not wasted in influence activities, it could be used for directly

AC

productive activities or simply consumed as leisure.‖
These influence activities contrast with bribing activities (see e.g., Gneezy et al., 2018) as they do not
involve any monetary payments thus being difficult to detect. This might explain why influence
activities are likely to be pervasive within firms whereas bribing activities are not.
To assess the causal effect of performance manipulation on organizational performance, we consider
two experiments in which workers can or cannot engage in window-dressing activities.

3
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In our first experiment, we consider organizations composed of four workers without a manager. In
that setting, window-dressing activities were either available or not, and workers‘ compensation was
either an equal share (25%) of organizational production (equal pay treatments) or a share of
organizational production which was based on workers‘ observed contribution (observed-performance
pay treatments). Equal pay treatments thus provide workers with team incentives. When window-
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dressing activities were not available, observed contribution was equal to actual contribution in which
case workers were paid as in an individual piece-rate incentive scheme. When window-dressing
activities were available, they allowed workers to increase their observed contribution and claim a
higher share of organizational production.

We find that window-dressing is much more prevalent under observed-performance pay than under

AN
US

equal pay. Under observed-performance pay, almost all workers engaged in performance manipulation
spending on average 13.8% of their time with a frozen screen compared to 2.0% under equal pay. It
follows that when window-dressing activities were available organizational production was significantly
(28.7%) higher under equal pay than under observed-performance pay whereas the opposite was true
when window-dressing activities were not available. This means that the beneficial effect of equal pay

M

on deterring window-dressing activities more than offset its negative incentive effect. The participants to
Experiment 1 completed a battery of tests when signing up to the lab thus allowing us to study the

ED

individual determinants of window-dressing activities. Our results provide insights to potential recruiters
who want to avoid wasteful performance manipulation activities while relying on performance pay to
motivate workers. We show that more spiteful and more cognitively reflective workers engage more

PT

often in performance manipulation and produce less in the observed-performance pay treatment in
which window-dressing is available. The fact that workers who score high on the cognitive reflection

CE

scale produce less in our setting is particularly striking given that cognitive reflection is commonly
associated with high performance (e.g., Corgnet et al., 2015e). In addition, cognitive reflection

AC

significantly and positively correlates with general intelligence which has been shown to be the best
predictor of work performance (e.g., Schmidt, 2009) as well as diligence on the job (e.g., Corgnet et al.,
2015c). For example, in the observed-performance pay treatment in which window-dressing is not
available, cognitive reflection relates positively and significantly with production.
In Experiment 2, we extend Experiment 1 by setting up an organizational environment in which three
workers are under the supervision of one manager. Our aim was to assess the extent to which managers
can reduce performance manipulation by adjusting workers‘ incentive schemes. Workers‘ compensation
4
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was either an equal share (20%) of organizational production (equal pay treatments) or a share of
organizational production chosen at the discretion of the manager at the end of each period (discrete pay
treatments). Regardless of the treatment, the manager always received a fixed share (40%) of
organizational production. Experiment 2 differs from Experiment 1 as the manager could monitor in
real-time the evolution of workers‘ performance thus being able to detect excessive window-dressing
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activities which would lead to unlikely high levels of observed performance. Thus, Experiment 2 allows
us to study monitoring as a possible mechanism to tamper performance manipulation. In addition, in
Experiment 2 managers could limit the incentives to engage in performance manipulation by
deliberately paying every worker the same or more generally by making pay less sensitive to
performance. Not surprisingly, we report less window-dressing activities in Experiment 2 than in

AN
US

Experiment 1.

Nevertheless, we replicated the main findings of the first experiment regarding the relationship
between incentive schemes, window-dressing activities and organizational production. In particular, in
the discrete pay treatments, organizational production was significantly lower when window-dressing
activities were available than when they were not. We reported no significant differences in

M

organizational production between the equal pay treatments. In Experiment 2, we obtained further
insights on workers‘ window-dressing activities in a context in which these activities could be detected

ED

by a manager. We find, unlike Experiment 1, that workers mostly engage in minimal window-dressing
activities exaggerating their performance metric by the minimum possible amount so as not to be
detected cheating. We find that window-dressing activities led to an increase in workers‘ pay for those

PT

who exaggerated their production by the minimum possible amount. By contrast, window-dressing

amount.

CE

activities led to a decrease in workers‘ pay for those who exaggerated their production by a larger

Finally, Experiment 2 also allowed us to investigate how managers set incentives when performance

AC

manipulation is available to workers. We find that managers weakened incentives when windowdressing activities were available by reducing the link between observed performance and workers‘ pay
compared to the case in which window-dressing activities were not available.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature and discuss our
contribution. In Section 3 we develop our conceptual framework and present our hypotheses. In Sections
4 and 5, we present the design and results of Experiments 1 and 2. Section 6 concludes.

5
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2. Related literature
2.1.

Theory of the firm

An essential ingredient of any theory of the firm is to provide a convincing explanation for the
empirical observation that firms heavily rely on low-powered incentive schemes (Gibbons and Roberts,
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2013). By showing that equal pay can improve upon performance pay in the presence of influence
activities, we provide empirical support for the influence cost theory of the firm. Our work thus belongs
to a small but growing literature providing causal tests of different theories of the firm.2 These works are
especially crucial given the general imbalance between the many theories of the firm and the few
empirical tests (e.g., Baker and Holmström, 1995; Prendergast, 2002). Our findings can also be seen as

AN
US

providing empirical support for the multitasking theory of the firm (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991;
Dewatripont et al., 2000) which has been growingly popular among organizational economists. Our
organizational setting can indeed be described as a multitasking problem where workers can either exert
effort to produce a valuable product or spend time producing a valueless product. We then show that, in
a context in which the performance metric only consists in the volume of production, workers will

M

inefficiently assign their time to the production of valueless products. This activity is what we have
referred to as performance manipulation or window-dressing. The link between the multitasking and the

ED

influence costs theories of the firm was already established by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) as well
as Baker (1992). More specifically, we show that equal pay can alleviate the misallocation of time due

PT

to multitasking issues thus ultimately leading to greater organizational performance than performance
pay.

Deception literature

CE

2.2.

Starting with the seminal work of Gneezy (2005), deception games have been used extensively to

AC

study lying behavior. The deception game, inspired from the work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), is a
two-player setting in which the first player possesses private information about the monetary
consequences of the action taken by a second player. The first player can send a message to induce the
second player to take the action that will be most favorable to the first player. Our work extends this
2

For example, the hold-up theory of the firm developed by Klein et al. (1978) was investigated by Sloof et al. (2004; 2007), the property rights model of
Hart (1995) was tested by Sonnemans et al. (2001) and the monitoring in teams model of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) was tested by Grosse et al. (2011).
The theory of contracts as reference points (Hart and Moore, 2008) was tested in Fehr et al. (2011).

6

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

previous literature by studying performance manipulation in an organizational context. Two crucial
features characterize our organizational environment. First, unlike deception games, our setting is not a
zero-sum game as performance manipulation can hurt firm profits as it creates negative externalities by
wasting time that could be dedicated to organizational duties (Experiments 1 and 2). Second, we
consider a hierarchical setting in which a manager can monitor and decide upon subordinates‘ payments
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(Experiment 2). Managers can detect and sanction lying behavior thus tampering its negative effect on
organizational performance. They can also weaken incentives to limit the monetary gains associated
with misrepresenting one‘s own contribution.

Our organizational setting may affect prosocial motives (e.g., Gino and Pierce, 2009; Atanasov and
Dana, 2011; Erat and Gneezy, 2012) or social identity (Shalvi and Leiser, 2013; Utikal and Fischbacher,

AN
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2013) thus impacting dishonest behavior. At the same time, an organizational setting may foster
dishonest behavior as a few dishonest subjects may rapidly spread unethical behaviors in groups (e.g.,
Carrell et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2013). A priori, it is unclear whether our organizational context would
lead to widespread dishonesty. However, we observe pervasive lying behavior in our setup confirming
previous findings in deception games (see Gneezy, 2005) and in individual cheating tasks (Shalvi et al.,

M

2011a; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Our work not only studies dishonesty in an organizational
context but it also investigates organizational mechanisms that can deter manipulation activities such as

ED

performance monitoring and incentive schemes. We find that both intensive monitoring and weak
incentive schemes can effectively reduce the extent of performance manipulation activities.
Despite the large number of works studying honest behavior (e.g., Gino, 2015; Jacobsen et al., 2018),

PT

little is known on the individual determinants of lying behavior (Abeler et al., 2018; Capraro, 2017). In a
meta-analysis of 50 deception games, Capraro (2017) identifies education level as a main predictor of

CE

using deceptive strategies. Abeler et al. (2018) combining data from 72 experimental studies show that
the preference for being honest with a preference for being seen as honest reduce lying behavior.

AC

Cabrales et al. (2016) also show that more spiteful subjects tend to engage in more deceptive strategies.
Our work complements these studies by showing that, in our organizational context, both spite and
cognitive reflection (which correlates with IQ and educational levels, Frederick, 2005) predict lying
behavior even after controlling for a wealth of individual characteristics including personality traits and
risk attitudes.
2.3.

Cheating and sabotage in tournaments

7
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Related to our work is the experimental literature on cheating and sabotage in tournaments that puts
forward the negative consequences of relative performance pay (e.g., Konrad, 2000; Preston and
Szymanski, 2003; Harbring et al., 2007; Kräkel, 2007; Schwieren and Weichselbaumer, 2010; Harbring
and Irlenbusch, 2011; Balafoutas et al., 2012b; see Chowdhury and Gürtler, 2015 for a review). Our set
up differs from standard tournament settings which represent competitive environments rather than
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cooperative environments in which organizational members can mutually benefit from the high
performance of other members. In our experiments, we consider an organizational setting in which
organizational members‘ efforts determine the total amount of money which is available to reward
workers. In contrast with tournament incentives which tend to exacerbate competition by clearly
recognizing one contest winner (e.g., Sheremeta, 2016), our setup considers linear incentive schemes in

AN
US

which pay is proportional to performance metrics. It is worth noting that contests may share some of the
organizational features of our setting as is, for example, the case of Tullock contests in which prizes
depend on contestants‘ effort (see e.g., Chung, 1996; Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011; see also
Chowdhury et al., 2014 for an experimental study). The organizational context we envision, unlike
tournaments, may foster social motives thus leading workers to adopt a cooperative behavior because

M

they value organizational norms (e.g., Kandel and Lazear, 1992) as well as care about the well-being of
other members of the organizations (see e.g., Bandiera et al., 2010). This makes our findings regarding

ED

the pervasiveness of window-dressing activities especially striking.
Another important aspect of our work is to assess the effect of incentive schemes on performance
manipulation. In that respect, the closest paper to ours is the work of Carpenter et al. (2010). In a real-

PT

effort experiment where workers had to prepare letters and envelopes, the authors compared workers‘
production in a tournament setting in which performance was assessed by a supervisor with a

CE

tournament in which performance was partly determined by peers. In their setting, performance
manipulation followed from peers underreporting others‘ performance to increase their chance of

AC

winning the tournament prize. This led to a lower level of performance in the tournament with peer
evaluations than in the tournament setting with supervisor evaluation. They compared workers‘
performance under tournament incentives with their performance under piece rates. The authors showed
that when peers were in charge of reporting performance workers produced more under piece rates than
under tournament incentives whereas the opposite was true when supervisors were in charge of
performance reporting. In a recent study, Balafoutas et al. (2017) replicated these findings in a lab in the
field experiment conducted with auditors at a major conference venue.
8

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Instead of considering tournament incentives, we built on the literature in performance manipulation
to assess the extent to which weakening incentives, for example using equal pay, can be beneficial to the
organization by countervailing window-dressing activities. Our setting is thus one in which performance
manipulation can arise even in the absence of relative pay. Balafoutas et al. (2017) also considered a
team incentive setting in which workers could overreport others‘ performance to increase their partners‘
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pay at the expense of the experimenter. Their setting differs from our experiments as workers do not
have the opportunity to overreport their own performance at the expense of other workers. Importantly,
in our experiments window-dressing activities are time consuming thus affecting negatively
organizational performance and reducing the amount of money to be shared among workers. This is the
case because we consider window-dressing activities during which workers can exaggerate their

AN
US

production and obtain a higher pay without engaging in sabotage. Another major difference between our
setting and the works of Carpenter et al. (2010) and Balafoutas et al. (2017) is that we consider, in
Experiment 2, the case in which managers can monitor workers and partly detect performance
manipulation while having full discretion over workers‘ pay.

The paper of Charness et al. (2014) also relates to our study as it allows workers to engage in both

M

sabotage and window-dressing. It differs from our study as the authors do not assess the effect of
incentives. Instead, they deliberately chose a flat-wage environment to assess the willingness of workers

ED

to engage in personally costly sabotage and window-dressing for status-enhancing motives only.
Our main finding that equal pay outperforms performance pay is thus new to the experimental
literature. Additionally, Experiment 1 allowed us to establish an individual profile of the typical

PT

performance manipulator whereas Experiment 2 showed how managers can use monitoring technologies
to weaken incentives and limit window-dressing activities. Finally, Experiment 2 showed how workers,

CE

despite tight manager‘s supervision, were able to boost their pay by engaging in subtle performance
manipulation. Importantly, both experiments show that the positive deterrence effect of equal pay on

AC

window-dressing more than offsets its negative incentive effect.
3. Conceptual framework
Our aim here is to illustrate, using a stylized model, the main implication of the literature on influence
costs and performance manipulation regarding the detrimental effect of performance pay on
organizational performance when window-dressing activities are available to workers. Our model is thus

9
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not aimed at being an exact representation of our experimental framework. In particular, we consider a
setup in which both effort and window-dressing are binary decisions.
We consider an organization which is composed of n workers who can either work or shirk as well as
engage in performance manipulation activities. We will compare organizational performance under two
contracts: one in which workers are paid based on their observed contribution to the organization
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(observed-performance pay) and one in which all workers are paid an equal share of organizational
production (equal pay). We also incorporate social motives in our framework thus complementing our
standard incentive theory toolkit (see e.g., Laffont and Martimort, 2002) with the insights of behavioral
contract theory (e.g., Rotemberg, 1994; Grund and Sliwka, 2007; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010; Dur

3.1.

Workers
*

Worker

+ can either exert effort on the work task (

the task implies a cost
(

AN
US

and Sol, 2010; Bierbrauer et al., 2017).

) with probability

) or shirk (

). Working on

. Exerting effort will generate a positive output for the organization
and no output (

) with probability

. Exerting no effort always

M

leads to no output. We assume that exerting high effort is socially efficient because the expected value
created by workers when exerting effort is greater than its cost (

ED

can engage in time-consuming window-dressing activities (
(

). Instead of working, workers
) at a private cost χ or not do so

). Workers will thus choose whether to exert effort and whether to engage in window-dressing

PT

activities by maximizing their expected utility subject to the constraint that

. This constraint

follows from the fact that workers can either exert effort in which case window-dressing activities are
), shirk while engaging in window-dressing activities (

).

) or not (

CE

useless (

For window-dressing to be appealing, we assume it is less costly than completing the work task so
. In addition to the private cost , window-dressing activities are socially costly because they

AC

that

prevent workers from completing the work task and generate output for the organization (see Milgrom,
1988). Nonetheless, workers may gain from window-dressing activities as they will positively affect the
observed measure of output of their effort ( ̂ ). We assume that when worker
dressing, the observed output of shirking will be equal to ̂
̂ :=(

) .

10

with probability

engages in window. It follows that
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In addition to observing ̂ , the manager knows the total output of the organization. However, because
the manager cannot break the budget and is thus assumed to redistribute all the organizational output to
workers, he or she cannot use the total output of the organization to prevent window-dressing activities
by not paying workers if proof of window-dressing activities is obtained.
We assume workers to be risk neutral, abstracting away from risk-sharing issues, and focusing our
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attention on the effect of performance manipulation on contract design and organizational performance
(see Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Gibbons, 2005; Powell, 2015).

In addition to profit maximization, we consider workers‘ social motives which may include altruism
(caring about others‘ payoffs), inequality aversion (preferring equal distribution of payoffs) or spite
(valuing others‘ payoffs negatively) (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Balafoutas et al., 2012a).

AN
US

As organizations represent a social context, we expect social motives to play an important role. For
example, Rotemberg (1994) and Andreoni (1995) show that altruism may alleviate shirking in
organizations. Because altruistic workers care about other organizational members‘ well-being, they
may refrain from engaging in window-dressing activities as they ultimately affect others‘ pay negatively.
By contrast, spiteful workers who are willing to earn more than others even at a cost for themselves or

M

for the organization are likely to engage in window-dressing activities to boost their earnings. To study
the impact of social preferences on window-dressing activities, we assume workers are endowed with

(̂ )

)

PT

(

(1)

ED

the following utility function (à la Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) subject to

∑

* (̂ )

(̂ ) +

:

∑

* (̂ )

(̂ ) +

CE

( ̂ ) stands for the pay of worker i given observed performance ̂ The parameters

where

and

capture envy and shame when positive. Altruistic individuals are characterized by negative envy and
) whereas spiteful individuals are such that

AC

shame (

Corgnet et al., 2015a). Selfish workers are such that
3.2.

and

(see e.g.,

0.

Payment schemes

We now turn to the payment schemes offered to workers ( ( ̂ )). We consider two types of contracts:
equal pay and observed-performance pay. Equal pay contracts reward each worker an equal share of
organizational production. In that setting, all workers are thus paid the same amount regardless of
11
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observed performance so that there is no material incentive or social motive to engage in windowdressing. Under observed-performance pay contracts are based on the observed contribution of workers
who are rewarded as follows:
∑ ̂

) and ( ̂ ∑ ̂ ) is the observed contribution of

denotes organizational production (∑
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where

̂

(̂ )

(2)

worker i. Regardless of the payment scheme, organizational production ( ) is observable by all workers.
In Appendix A, we formally derive two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 (Performance manipulation and organizational production)

AN
US

A) Workers engage in window-dressing activities under observed-performance pay but not
under equal pay.

B) Under observed-performance pay, the positive link between workers‘ pay and performance
is reduced by the presence of window-dressing activities.

C) Under observed-performance pay, organizational production is lower in the presence of

M

window-dressing activities. Under equal pay, organizational production is not affected by

ED

the presence of window-dressing activities.
Hypothesis 1C stresses the negative consequences of window-dressing on organizational production in
line with the influence costs literature (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Gibbons, 2005). It implies that

PT

equal pay will be an effective solution to thwart window-dressing. An empirical question is to assess
whether the negative incentive effect of equal pay can be more than offset by its beneficial deterrence

CE

effect on window-dressing. That is, weaker incentives schemes may be optimal when window-dressing
activities are available to workers.

AC

Because window-dressing takes away resources from the firm and negatively affects other
organizational members, altruistic workers are less likely to engage in such activities whereas spiteful
workers are more likely to do so (see Appendix A). Because window-dressing activities prevent workers
from completing the effortful task, the opportunity costs of such activities are the highest for high-skill
workers. We derive the following hypothesis to capture these implications of our model.

Hypothesis 2 (Profiling the manipulators)
12
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A) More spiteful and less altruistic workers engage in more window-dressing activities.
B) More skilled workers engage in less window-dressing activities.
Hypothesis 2A is similar to the conjecture derived in Grund and Sliwka (2007) in the context of
tournaments in which they show that spiteful workers are more likely to engage in sabotage activities
whereas compassionate workers are less likely to do so.
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In Experiment 1, we test these hypotheses in a stylized work environment that captures the essential
features of our model. In Experiment 2, we will consider an environment that extends our stylized model
allowing for managers to monitor workers and set their pay.

4.1.

Experimental design and procedures

AN
US

4. Experiment 1

The virtual workplace.— We use an environment in which participants can undertake a real-effort task
while having access to Internet (real-leisure alternative) at any point in time during the experiment
(Corgnet et al., 2015d; 2015e). The introduction of Internet as the real-leisure alternative is motivated by

M

the widespread use of Internet at work (e.g., Malachowski, 2005; Ugrin and Pearson, 2013). An
appealing feature of Internet as an alternative to the work task is the wide range of activities that can be

ED

completed online.

We consider a particularly long and laborious summation task (e.g., Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Eriksson

PT

et al., 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) so as to ensure that completing the work task required a
substantial amount of effort. Participants were asked to sum up matrices of 36 numbers comprised

CE

between 0 and 3 for two periods of ten minutes each. The numbers in each table were generated
randomly. Participants were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or calculator. This rule amplified the
level of effort participants had to exert in order to complete tables correctly.

AC

Each table completed correctly generated 40 cents of individual production while a penalty of 20 cents
was subtracted from individual production for each incorrect answer. Penalties did not apply when
individual production was equal to zero so that individual production could not be negative. Individuals
could thus not sabotage the organization‘s output. Also, individuals could not suffer losses. Penalties
were introduced so that participants could not generate monetary rewards by simply guessing the right
answer.
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At any point during the experiment, participants could switch from the work task to the leisure activity
(browsing the Internet). Each activity was undertaken separately, in a different screen, so that
participants could not complete tables while being on the Internet. Participants were informed that their
use of the Internet was strictly confidential. Participants were free to consult their email or visit any web
page. The Internet browser was embedded in the software so that the experimenter could keep record of

participants were randomly assigned to groups of four.
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the exact amount of time participants spent on each activity. At the beginning of each of the two periods,

Payment schemes.—At the end of each period, participants were rewarded a share of the production of
the organization defined as the sum of the individual production of the four organizational members. In
the equal pay treatments, each of the four participants was rewarded an equal share of 25% of

AN
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organizational production. In the observed-performance pay treatments, the share of organizational
production assigned to workers was calculated as ̂ ∑ ̂ where worker i‘s observed performance ( ̂)
is the sum of one‘s actual performance and the increase in observed performance obtained from windowdressing activities. Regardless of the payment scheme, organizational production ( ) was observed by

M

all workers.

Window-dressing activities.—In the window-dressing treatments, participants had access to an additional

ED

activity which was referred to as boost in the experiment. This activity allowed workers to increase their
observed level of performance by 40 cents every sixty seconds. This was calibrated so that an average-

PT

ability worker could achieve a higher level of observed performance by simply engaging in windowdressing activities. If workers only dedicated their time to window-dressing they could achieve a level of

CE

observed performance of 400 cents whereas average performance in the observed-performance pay
treatment in which window-dressing was not available was 340 cents. After clicking on a confirmation
button, the screen of the workers was frozen for 30 seconds. This aimed at representing the cost

AC

associated with time-consuming window-dressing activities that detract workers from the work task
(Milgrom, 1988). This 30-second freeze represented 5% of the time available in a given period and
about half the time an average-ability worker needs to complete one table correctly in the work task.3
Participants could easily keep track of their window-dressing activities in a given period because the
total amount by which they exaggerated their production was recorded in the history panel at the bottom

3

This estimate was computed using data from Corgnet et al. (2015b) who used the same task for a different experiment on goal setting.
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of their screen. Workers could also keep track of their actual level of production during a given period.
At the end of each period, participants were informed of their individual pay as well as organizational
production.
In the no window-dressing treatments, workers could not exaggerate their production as the boost
option was disabled. We conducted four treatments as part of a 22 factorial design (see Table 1). The
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complete set of instructions for Experiment 1 is available online (see Appendix D).
TABLE 1—FACTORIAL DESIGN
Payment Scheme
Number of
Observed-performance
participants (organizations) [sessions]
Equal Pay
Pay
Absent
56 (14) [7]
56 (14) [7]
Window-dressing Activities
Present
56 (14) [7]
56 (14) [7]
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Procedures.—Our participant pool consisted of students from a major US University. In total, 224
participants completed the experiments, divided in 28 sessions. We conducted seven sessions for each
treatment. In each session, we had a total of 8 participants divided up in two organizations of four
workers.

The experiment was computerized and all of the interactions were anonymous. The instructions were

M

displayed on participants‘ computer screens. Participants had exactly 20 minutes to read the instructions
(a 20-minute timer was shown on the laboratory screen).

ED

All of the subjects who were recruited for this experiment already participated in a prior one-hour
survey as part of the laboratory policy to collect individual information, including gender, summation

PT

skills and prosociality, about subjects who are registered in the pool (see Corgnet et al., 2018a). On
average, participants to our experiment undertook this survey 6 months prior to the current experiment.

CE

In the ―summation skills‖ task, participants were asked to sum as many five one-digit numbers as they
could during two minutes. Each correct answer was rewarded 10 cents and the average earnings on this

AC

task were $1.5. The number of correct answers is what we refer to as ―summation skills‖. Prosociality
was measured using the elicitation task of Bartling et al. (2009) which was later extended by Corgnet et
al. (2015a).

Participants were paid their earnings in cash. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment were
computed as the sum of the earnings in the 2 periods. Participants earned on average $13.4, including a
show-up fee of $7. In Experiment 1, the show-up fee corresponds to about 50% of total earnings which
is undoubtedly high. However, the policy of the lab where the experiment was conducted requires using
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the same show-up fee of $7 for all experiments regardless of length. In Experiment 2, the show-up fee
represents slightly less than 30% of total earnings. Experimental sessions lasted on average an hour.
4.2.

Results

We use regression analyses to assess the statistical significance of our results. All reported p-values
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thus refer to regression results if not stated otherwise. We use panel regressions with random effects
when assessing individual effects (Hypotheses 1A, 1B and 2) and conduct Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
regressions when assessing organizational production (Hypothesis 1C). In each regression, we control
for summation skills and gender. We thus consider a total of 112 (56 subjects  2 periods) observations
for each of the treatments when studying individual effects. For organizational production, we consider a
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total of 56 independent observations. Our results are qualitatively unaffected by using non-parametric
tests instead of regression analyses. Our methodological choice is to rely exclusively on regression
results as they allow us to control for differences in ability levels across treatments. We proceed by
testing each of our hypotheses.

M

Hypotheses 1A & 1B: Performance manipulation.—In line with Hypothesis 1A, we report that, under
observed-performance pay, almost all participants (92.9%) engaged (at least once) in window-dressing

ED

activities in a given period compared to 33.3% in the case of equal pay (see Table 2). Under observedperformance pay, workers used window-dressing activities 5.5 times on average in a period compared to
0.8 times for equal pay. This implies that workers‘ screens were on average frozen for 13.8% of their

PT

available time under observed-performance pay compared to only 2.0% for equal pay. Thus, participants
exaggerated their production on average by 170.6% under observed-performance pay compared to

CE

15.5% under equal pay.

TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES FOR BOTH THE OBSERVED-PERFORMANCE PAY AND THE
EQUAL PAY TREATMENTS

AC

Window-dressing Activities

Proportion of workers who engaged in window-dressing
activities in a given period
% of available time dedicated to window-dressing activities
% of exaggeration of performance
Notes: Standard deviations (in parentheses).
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Payment Scheme
ObservedEqual
performance Pay
Pay
92.9%
33.3%
(25.9%)
(47.2%)
13.8%
2.0%
(8.5%)
(4.2%)
170.6%
15.5%
(219.1%)
(34.9%)

p-valuea
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

a

These p-values are computed using a panel regression with random effects and robust standard errors clustered at the organization level. The reported pvalues correspond to the coefficient of the discrete pay dummy (which takes value one for observed-performance pay treatments and value zero for equal
pay treatments). We use a gender dummy and summation skills as controls. Similar results are obtained using standard parametric and non-parametric tests.

In line with Hypothesis 1A, we show that window-dressing activities were pervasive and substantially
more pronounced under observed-performance pay than under equal pay. Under equal pay, windowdressing activities are not totally absent, however. Participants may have felt curious to try, at least once,
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the window-dressing option which was available on their screen. This interpretation is consistent with
the fact that, under equal pay, more than half (51.3%) of those who engaged in window-dressing
activities only did it once compared to only 8.7% under observed-performance pay. Also, we note that
the number of times participants engaged in window-dressing decreased from 0.91 in the first period to
0.69 in the second period under equal pay (Sign rank test, p-value = 0.008) whereas it increased from
4.8 to 6.1 under observed-performance pay (Sign rank test, p-value = 0.007).4
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In line with Hypothesis 1B, we show that the relationship between a worker‘s pay and a worker‘s
contribution is significantly weaker in the presence of window-dressing activities that in their absence.
Indeed, in the absence of window-dressing, a $1 increase in one‘s performance increases pay by exactly
$1 compared to only $0.58 in the presence of window-dressing (see Table B.1 in Appendix B, p-value <

M

0.001 for testing the equality of coefficients, using a Wald test). The relationship between performance
and pay in the presence of window-dressing is, however, significantly higher under observed-

ED

performance pay than under equal pay (p-value < 0.001).5 This means that, despite the presence of
window-dressing activities, observed performance still incorporated some valuable information about

PT

individual contribution.

Hypothesis 1C: Organizational production.—Under observed-performance pay, workers dedicated

CE

13.8% of their time to window-dressing thus leaving only 86.2% of their time available for completing
the task compared to 98% under equal pay. In the treatments in which window-dressing was not
available, workers could potentially dedicate all their time to the completion of the task. Because

AC

workers spent a very limited share of their time to browse the Internet regardless of the treatment, almost
all the time workers did not spend on window-dressing activities was dedicated to the work task.6 We
thus expect, in line with Hypothesis 1C, that under observed-performance pay organizational production
4

Similar results are obtained when using panel regression analyses with robust standard errors clustered at the organizational level.

5

This is the p-value corresponding to the Wald test that the observed performance coefficient is equal to 0.25. Indeed, by construction, in equal pay
treatments a $1 increase in one‘s production will increase pay by $0.25.
6
Workers spent on average 2.5% of their time on the Internet across all treatments. The overall time spent online by each worker did not vary across
treatments as the six pairwise comparisons across treatments produced p-values greater than 0.10 for the corresponding Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests.
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will be lower when window-dressing activities are available than when they are not. We expect no
differences in production under equal pay whether window-dressing activities are available or not. Our
findings support this claim as is illustrated in Figure 1 below. Under observed-performance pay,
organizational production is 26.3% lower when window-dressing activities are available than when they
are not (p-value < 0.001). About half of this effect (13.8%) can be attributed to the time wasted in
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window-dressing activities which could have been used to undertake the task. The other half of the
effect can be attributed to the weakening of incentives in the window-dressing treatment (Hypothesis
1B).

Under equal pay, organizational production is not significantly different whether window-dressing

ED

M
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activities are available or not (p-value = 0.361).

FIGURE 1. Box-plots for organizational production across treatmentsA

PT

Notes: a P-values are computed using OLS regressions with robust standard errors. The reported p-values correspond to the coefficient of the windowdressing dummy (which takes value one for treatments in which window-dressing is available and value zero otherwise). We control for gender and
summation skills. These variables are defined as organizational levels averages.

CE

We also put forward that, in the presence of window-dressing activities, organizational production is
28.7% higher under equal pay than under observed-performance pay (p-value = 0.003). By contrast, in

AC

the absence of window-dressing activities, organizational production is slightly, though not significantly,
higher under observed-performance pay than under equal pay (p-value = 0.322). However,
organizational production under observed-performance pay and no window-dressing activities is
significantly greater when compared to both equal pay treatments (p-value = 0.076).
These results echo an important finding in the influence costs literature according to which limiting
managerial discretion by relying on equal pay can be an effective response to influence activities. Thus,
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weaker incentive schemes such as equal pay are likely to be popular in organizations as they lead to
higher production levels than performance pay when performance manipulation is possible.

Hypothesis 2: Individual profiling of performance manipulators.—We test Hypothesis 2 according to
which window-dressing activities and workers‘ production are affected by workers‘ social motives and
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skills. To assess social motives, we use the elicitation task of Bartling et al. (2009) (and extended by
Corgnet et al., 2015a). In particular, we define a prosocial index which measures the extent to which a
person values others‘ payoffs positively. This index takes values from 0 to 6, where the lowest value
corresponds to spitefulness (a person who values negatively others‘ payoffs) and the highest possible
value corresponds to altruism (see Table C.3 in online Appendix C). We obtain similar results when
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using envy and negative envy to assess spitefulness and altruism, respectively. To isolate the respective
effects of spitefulness and altruism, we define a spiteful dummy (altruism dummy) which takes value
one whenever a person‘s score is in the bottom quartile (top quartile) of the prosocial index. 7 Because of
the highly negative and significant correlation between spitefulness and altruism (ρ = -0.514, p-value <
0.001), we conduct separate regressions for these two social motives to avoid collinearity issues. In line

M

with Hypothesis 2, we report that workers‘ summation skills negatively affect window-dressing (see
Table 3). In addition, we show that prosociality reduces window-dressing activities whereas it affects

ED

production positively. Also in line with Hypothesis 2, spitefulness relates positively to window-dressing
whereas altruism has the opposite effect. Spitefulness also significantly reduces production whereas
altruism has a positive effect on production (although this effect is not statistically significant, p-value =

PT

0.365).

A plausible mechanism by which spite could have fostered window-dressing activities hinges upon

CE

workers‘ negative reciprocity toward those organizational members who are believed to engage in
window-dressing. The positive and significant coefficient associated to the variable period in Table 3

AC

suggests that workers may have started with an optimistic belief regarding the extent of others‘ windowdressing activities which was then revised upward thus leading to an increase in the magnitude of
window-dressing activities over time.
TABLE 3—PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WINDOW-DRESSING (IN SECONDS) AND WORKERS‘
PRODUCTION (IN CENTS) IN THE OBSERVED-PERFORMANCE PAY TREATMENT WITH WINDOW-DRESSING
Dependent
Window-dressing
Production

7

Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of our spiteful and altruism dummies such as considering the top and bottom 10% values of the
prosocial index as thresholds.
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variable
185.53***
(69.18)
-17.19***
(6.48)

162.65***
(67.08)

-

-

Spiteful dummy

-

56.14*
(30.64)

Altruism dummy

-

-

50.71***
(18.32)
-3.59*
(2.07)

Period
Summation Skills
Gender Dummy
(1 if female)
Observations
(organizations)
R2

-59.41
(63.04)
15.88**
(2.95)

25.15
(50.85)

-33.93
(59.09)

-

-

-

-76.87***
(25.57)

-

-

-

50.71***
(18.32)
-3.98**
(1.67)

-39.42**
(20.48)
50.71***
(18.32)
-3.69*
(2.14)

19.29
(14.92)
15.21***
(2.96)

19.29
(14.92)
15.73***
(2.34)

22.693
(25.08)
19.29
(14.92)
15.27***
(3.09)

-48.43
(36.07)

-55.88
(35.346)

-37.95
(37.02)

13.06
(30.11)

24.54
(28.29)

2.81
(31.53)

n = 112
(14)
0.115

n = 112
(14)
0.113

n = 112
(14)
0.096

n = 112
(14)
0.420

n = 112
(14)
0.447

n = 112
(14)
0.401
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Prosocial index

112.29***
(68.67)
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Intercept

Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.

The one-hour survey completed by the workers participating in Experiment 1 included more
individual measures than the ones reported in Table 3 such as personality traits, fluid intelligence, risk
attitudes or cognitive reflection (see online Appendix C for a full description). We assess the potential

M

explanatory power of these measures on window-dressing and production in Table B.2 in Appendix B.
We first find that our previous findings regarding the importance of skills and prosocial concerns is

ED

robust to including additional individual controls.8 The only variable that significantly predicts windowdressing and production in addition to prosociality and skills is cognitive reflection. This result is
statistically significant at the 1% level despite our analysis controlling for a standard cognitive skills

PT

measure such as the Raven test score. This suggests that it is cognitive reflection and not standard
cognitive skills that can explain workers‘ behavior in our environment. Cognitive reflection is a good

CE

proxy for effortful and deliberative thinking (Toplack et al., 2011; 2014), often referred to as System 2
(Kahneman, 2011). Our results show that in addition to social motives and ability, a deliberative mindset

AC

may lead one to engage in more window-dressing activities thus contributing less to organizational
performance. This result is consistent with Capraro (2016) who shows a negative correlation between
lying in deception games and cognitive reflection scores. Our findings are consistent with the TruthDefault-Theory which posits that honesty comes naturally while dishonesty requires deliberation (see
Verschuere and Shalvi, 2013). Relatedly, Gino and Ariely (2012) found that creative thinkers which
8
Even though we only present the results using the prosocial index as independent variable, our results are robust to considering spiteful and altruism
dummies as independent variables (see Table B.3 in Appendix B) as well as controlling for additional individual characteristics (see Table B.4 in Appendix
B).
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have been found to exhibit higher cognitive reflection scores (see Corgnet et al., 2015a) are more
inclined to engage in more dishonest behaviors.
Our results may seem to contrast with recent findings using time pressure manipulations showing that
dishonest behaviors are intuitive rather than deliberative (e.g., Mead et al., 2009; Gino et al., 2011;
Shalvi et al., 2012). However, these works make use of individual cheating tasks such as the ‗die-under-
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cup task‘ in which participants privately roll a die and report, truthfully or not, the outcome which will
then determine their pay. We believe our findings show that, in a more complex organizational
environment than individual cheating tasks, lying may require deliberation. It may also be that trait-level
deliberation (as measured by cognitive reflection scores) leads to different results than state-level
deliberation induced by time pressure manipulations (Corgnet et al., 2016).
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The fact that reflective workers produce less in our setting is particularly striking given that cognitive
reflection has been commonly associated with high performance (e.g., Burks et al., 2015; Corgnet et al.,
2015c). Our findings also challenge the idea that more reflective people are generally willing to engage
in behaviors that benefit the group (e.g., Corgnet et al., 2015a; Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara, 2015). For
example, in the observed-performance pay treatment in which window-dressing is not available,

M

cognitive reflection relates positively and significantly with production (see Table B.3 in Appendix B).
To our knowledge, our results are the first to show that the presence of reflective workers may be

ED

detrimental to organizational production.

Our analysis of the individual determinants of performance manipulation can be used as guidance for
recruiters who want to limit wasteful window-dressing activities inside their organizations.

PT

In the short run, the effectiveness of selecting specific workers to thwart performance manipulation
can only be limited. In line with our findings, organizations could then rely on equal pay to deter

CE

performance manipulation. We investigate this possibility in more detail in our second experiment by
assessing the extent to which managers can reduce performance manipulation by supervising workers

AC

and adjusting their pay accordingly. To that end, we extend Experiment 1, by considering a workplace
environment that goes beyond our stylized model and include relevant features of real-world
organizations such as the presence of a manager who will be able to monitor workers‘ performance as
well as decide upon their compensation.
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5. Experiment 2
In this experiment, we consider a workplace environment which differs from Experiment 1 as each
organization of four members will now consist of three employees and one manager. Our aim is to test
the robustness of our findings in a more complex environment that endows managers full discretion over
pay (in the discrete pay treatments) while allowing them to monitor employees‘ performance in real
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time. We briefly describe our workplace environment below. In the online Appendix E, we extend the
model presented in Section 3 to the case in which a manager can set contracts to agents. We derive a
similar conjecture to Hypothesis 1 which is stated as Hypothesis 1E.
Experimental design and procedures
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5.1.

The virtual workplace.—We use the same virtual workplace platform as in Experiment 1. The main
difference is that organizations of four members now include one manager and three employees. At the
beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of these two roles. Unlike
Experiment 1, participants kept the same role and the same partners for the whole duration of the

M

experiment which consisted of five periods of 10 minutes. This was done so that managers could adjust
their pay policy over time based on their observation of employees‘ behavior. A longer experiment was

ED

also considered to assess the persistence of the effects uncovered in Experiment 1. The spirit of the
design of Experiment 2 was to extend Experiment 1 so as to test of the effect of payment schemes on the
magnitude of window-dressing activities in a work environment which more closely mimics actual

PT

workplaces.

CE

The manager.—In addition to working on the task and browsing the Internet, the manager could observe
the value of individual production (in cents) of each of the three employees at any time during a period
by accessing a separate window with a monitoring screen. At the end of each period, the manager

AC

received a monitoring summary which indicated the observed individual production of each of the
employees the last time the principal accessed the monitoring screen. As a result, managers could easily
obtain the maximum amount of information regarding employees‘ period production by accessing the
monitoring screen in the very last seconds of each period. At the end of each period, the manager as well
as each employee also received feedback regarding their own pay and the production of the
organization.
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Payment schemes.—At the end of each of the five periods, employees and managers were rewarded a
share of the production of the organization. Regardless of the treatment, the manager was always
rewarded 40% of organizational production. In the equal pay treatments, each of the three employees
was rewarded an equal share of 20% of organizational production. In the discrete pay treatments, the
manager chose how to allocate the remaining 60% of organizational production to the three employees.
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Regardless of the payment scheme, organizational production (Y) was observed by all workers.
Window-dressing activities.—As in Experiment 1, employees had access to an additional activity which
was referred to as boost in the window-dressing treatments. Unlike Experiment 1, employees were given
full discretion on the frequency at which and on the amount by which they wanted to exaggerate their
observed performance.
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At the end of each period, the manager knew the actual production of the organization. Thus, in cases
in which employees engaged in window-dressing activities, the actual production of the organization
differed from the sum of the observed individual productions in the manager‘s monitoring summary. In
addition, individual window-dressing activities could have been detected by the manager if an employee
chose a boost amount which was not a multiple of 30. This is the case because each correct table

M

generated 60 cents while an incorrect answer implied a 30-cent penalty. The value of a correct table and
the penalty associated to an incorrect one differs from Experiment 1 simply because of the need to

ED

calibrate participants‘ earnings so that they would on average be equal to the average hourly pay offered
in the lab. Thus, choosing a boost amount which was not a multiple of 30 would have indicated to the

PT

manager that the employee had engaged in window-dressing activities. An employee who decides to
engage in excessively large or frequent window-dressing activities may also be detected by the manager

CE

monitoring the worker‘s performance.
In the no window-dressing treatments, performance manipulation was not possible as the boost option

AC

was disabled. As in Experiment 1, we conducted four treatments as part of a 22 factorial design (see
Table B.5). The complete set of instructions for Experiment 1 is available online (see Appendix D).
Procedures.—Procedures were similar to Experiment 1. Upon arrival at the lab, ―summation skills‖ were
assessed using the same two-minute task as for the one-hour survey used in Experiment 1. Participants
earned on average $25.1, including a show-up fee of $7. Experimental sessions lasted on average two
hours and a half. Unlike Experiment 1, the subjects participating in this experiment were not recruited
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from the pool of subjects who undertook the one-hour survey that collected information about individual
characteristics.9
5.2.

Results

In this extended setting, we aim at testing Hypothesis 1A regarding the prevalence of window-dressing
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activities when managers can pay employees at their own discretion. We also want to assess the
weakening of incentives when window-dressing is available (Hypothesis 1B). The weakening of
incentives in the context in which managers have full discretion over workers‘ pay will, unlike
Experiment 1, crucially depends on managers‘ pay decisions. We also test Hypothesis 1C regarding the
negative effect of window-dressing activities on organizational production when managers have full
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discretion over pay.

Hypothesis 1A & 1B: Performance manipulation.—In line with Experiment 1, window-dressing
activities are pervasive and significantly more pronounced under discrete pay than under equal pay (see
Table 4). As is the case for Experiment 1, workers spent a very limited share of their time browsing the

M

Internet regardless of the treatment. Workers spent on average 2.1% of their time on the Internet across
all treatments.10

ED

TABLE 4—SUMMARY OF WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES
FOR BOTH THE DISCRETE PAY AND THE EQUAL PAY TREATMENTS
Window-dressing activities

PT

Proportion of workers who engaged in windowdressing activities in a given period

CE

% of available time dedicated to windowdressing activities
Median window-dressing amount

AC

% of exaggeration of performance

Payment Scheme
Discrete Pay
Equal Pay
55.0%
35.8%
(49.8%)
(48.0%)
4.6%
(8.2%)
148.0¢
(175.4¢)
45.7%
(83.1%)

3.1%
(7.9%)
110.8¢
(171.4¢)
38.7%
(62.9%)

p-value a
<0.001
0.252
0.253
0.652

Notes: Standard deviations (in parentheses).
a
Consistently with the rest of the results section, these p-values are computed using a panel regression with random effects and robust standard errors
clustered at the organization levels. The reported p-values correspond to the coefficient of the discrete pay dummy (which takes value one for discrete pay
treatments and value zero for equal pay treatments). We use a gender dummy and summation skills as controls. Similar results are obtained using standard
parametric and non-parametric tests.

9

Because of funding and timing constraints, not all subjects in the pool of subjects where the experiment was conducted completed the one-hour survey.
10
The overall time spent online by each worker did not vary across treatments as the six pairwise comparisons across treatments produced p-values
greater than 0.10 for the corresponding Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests.
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Under equal pay, window-dressing activities occupied employees for 3.1% of the time which is
similar to the time dedicated by employees to window-dressing in Experiment 1 (2.0%). However, the
percentage of time spent on window-dressing activities under discrete pay is substantially lower (4.6%)
than the time dedicated to these activities in the observed-performance pay treatment in Experiment 1
(4.6% vs 13.8%). Also, only about half of the employees engaged in window-dressing activities in a
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given period under discrete pay compared to 92.9% in Experiment 1 in the observed-performance pay
treatment. This suggests that the benefits of window-dressing activities were more limited in the
presence of a supervising manager. This is likely due to the fact that window-dressing activities may be
detected in Experiment 2 if they are undertaken too intensively.

To investigate that possibility in more detail, we classify window-dressing activities as either

AN
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detectable or undetectable. Because each correct table generated 60 cents while an incorrect answer
implied a 30-cent penalty, an employee‘s production level was necessarily a multiple of 30. An
employee who decided to exaggerate his or her production by an amount which was not a multiple of 30
was thus engaging in detectable window-dressing activities. An employee who exaggerated his or her
production by an excessively large amount could also be seen as engaging in detectable window-

M

dressing activities.

Window-dressing activities which are very unlikely to be detected by the manager are such that

ED

employees exaggerated their period production by the smallest possible amounts (i.e., one or two correct
tables).11 These amounts were actually the ones which were most likely to be chosen by workers. As is
shown in Figure 2, the large majority (68.2%) of window-dressing activities involved exaggerating one‘s

PT

own production by two tables or less. Employees who exaggerated their production by two tables or less
increased their observed production by 26.6% on average. By contrast, employees who exaggerated their

AC

CE

production by at least three tables increased their observed production by 131.3% on average.

11

We refer to the smallest integer number of tables. In our setting, workers could also exaggerate their production by less than the monetary value of one

table.
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Experiment 1
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Experiment 2
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FIGURE 2. Histogram for the amount (expressed as the number of correct tables) by which a worker
decided to exaggerate his or her observed production in a given period. experiment 2 is represented on the
left panel and experiment 1 on the right panel.

The fact that most employees decided to exaggerate their production by the smallest possible amount
is in line with the literature on cheating in individual tasks according to which people are willing to
avoid major lies (e.g., Shalvi et al., 2011b). In our case, however, the main motive is to avoid detection

M

of window-dressing activities by the manager. Indeed, when a manager is not present and cheating
cannot be detected, then only a minority of window-dressing activities (26.9%) consisted in
exaggerating one‘s own production by two tables or less (see right panel for Experiment 1 in Figure 2).

ED

Next, we attempt to understand employees‘ caution to engage in window-dressing activities in
Experiment 2 by analyzing the relationship between window-dressing activities and employees‘ pay. In

PT

Table 5, we regress an employee‘s pay on an independent variable that aims at capturing undetectable
window-dressing activities (“Two tables or less” window-dressing dummy). This dummy variable takes

CE

value one whenever an employee exaggerates his or her production in a given period by a total amount
either equal to 30¢, 60¢, 90¢ or 120¢ (that is, the monetary value of at most two correct tables, see

AC

column [1] in Table 5). In columns [2] and [3], we also include in our regression analysis a dummy
variable that takes value one whenever an employee exaggerated his or her production by three tables or
more (“Three tables or more” window-dressing dummy). Finally, we control for the actual contribution
of the employee as it is supposedly an important determinant of pay even when window-dressing
activities are available. We also control for employees‘ ability on the task using the ―summation skills‖
measure and gender.
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We report a positive and significant effect of undetectable window-dressing activities on employees‘
pay (see “Two tables or less” window-dressing dummy in columns [1] and [2] of Table 5). By contrast,
we do not observe such positive effect of window-dressing activities when considering only those
window-dressing activities by which employees exaggerated their production by three tables or more
(see “Three tables or more” window-dressing dummy in columns [2] and [3] in Table 5). Our regression
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results thus suggest that an employee could increase his or her discrete pay by engaging in windowdressing activities as long as such activities were undetectable. Interestingly, summation skills appear to
have no effect on employee‘s pay, regardless of the specification of the regression. That is, in the
presence of window-dressing activities, ability on the task does not seem to be an important driver of
employees‘ performance and of their subsequent pay. In Table B.6 in Appendix B, we provide

AN
US

additional analyses regarding the effect of window-dressing activities on pay. These findings show the
robustness of the positive effect of undetectable window-dressing activities on pay. The effectiveness of
window-dressing activities in boosting pay echoes the work of Robin et al. (2014). In their experimental
setting, workers‘ pay was determined by managers after observing workers‘ performance and workers‘
opinions on non-work-related issues. The authors show that workers were able to positively influence

M

their pay by expressing opinions which were similar to their bosses.

PT

ED

TABLE 5—PANEL REGRESSIONS ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF UNDETECTABLE WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES ON
DISCRETE PAY FOR THE TREATMENT WITH WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES AND DISCRETE PAY
Dependent variable
Discrete pay (in %)
[1]
[2]
[3]
21.883***
21.867***
22.987***
Intercept
(2.724)
(2.707)
(2.862)
0.016
(0.042)

0.032
(0.059)

0.037
(0.051)

Actual contribution (%)

0.338***
(0.094)

0.337***
(0.095)

0.340***
(0.094)

―Two tables or less‖ window-dressing dummy

3.882**
(1.700)

3.779**
(1.768)
-0.719
(2.346)
-0.064
(0.167)
-1.244
(2.210)
n = 240 (16)
0.253
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Period Trend

―Three tables or more‖ window-dressing dummy

-0.070
(0.179)
-1.190
(2.139)
n = 240 (16)
0.254

Summation Skills

Gender Dummy (1 if female)
Observations (organizations)
R²

Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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-1.618
(2.172)
-0.042
(0.185)
-1.364
(2.128)
n = 240 (16)
0.232
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In sum, the fact that window-dressing activities are less prevalent in Experiment 2 compared to
Experiment 1 is likely to be due to the presence of the manager who can detect and then punish
excessive manipulation attempts. It is interesting to note that monitoring, even in the absence of possible
punishments associated to lower pay, might inflict moral costs on workers thus deterring them from
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engaging in manipulation attempts (see Gneezy et al., 2018; Abeler et al., 2018). Another reason why
window-dressing activities may be limited can also be linked to the manager‘s ability to weaken
incentives thus rendering performance manipulation ineffective. To test the weakening of incentives in
the presence of window-dressing activities (Hypothesis 1B), we proceed, as for Experiment 1, by
assessing the extent to which performance explains employees‘ pay in the two discrete pay treatments.

AN
US

We find that when window-dressing activities are available, a $1 increase in one‘s performance
increases one‘s pay by $0.39 (when window-dressing consists of two tables or less) compared to $0.58
in the absence of window-dressing. This difference is statistically significant (see Table B.7 in the
Appendix B, p-value = 0.028). As is the case for Experiment 1, the relationship between performance
and pay in the presence of window-dressing is significantly higher under discrete pay than under equal

M

pay whether window-dressing is present or not (p-values < 0.001).12 This means managers rely on
employees‘ observed performance to determine their pay even when window-dressing pervasively

ED

distorts the informational content of the performance metric. Managers thus seem reluctant to rely
exclusively on equal pay to deter performance manipulation. This could be because managers
intrinsically value their decision rights over the pay of their subordinates (e.g., McClelland, 1975;

PT

Bartling et al., 2014) or because they believe employees value payment schemes that are at least partly
based on individual performance metrics (e.g., Ogbonnaya et al., 2017).

CE

At the same time, the results in Table 5 show that managers discounted observed performance
whenever employees exaggerated their performance by a large amount (see negative coefficient for the

AC

―Three tables or more‖ window-dressing dummy). Finally, managers were more likely to allocate
organizational production equally across employees in the presence of window-dressing (22.5% of the

12

These p-values correspond to the Wald tests that the coefficient associated to performance (see Table B.7) is equal to 0.25. Indeed, by construction, in
equal pay treatments a $1 increase in one‘s production will increase pay by $0.25.
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cases) than in its absence (18.7% of the cases) although this difference is not statistically significant (pvalue = 0.355).13
Hypothesis 1C: Organizational production.—We find support for Hypothesis 1C by showing that, under
discrete pay, the average production of the organization (per period) was on average 14.6% lower in the
window-dressing treatment ($16.25) compared to the no window-dressing treatment ($18.62) (see Figure
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3 below).

M

FIGURE 3. Box-plots for organizational production (per period, in cents) across treatmentsa

ED

Notes: a P-values are computed using OLS regressions with robust standard errors. The reported p-values correspond to the coefficient of the windowdressing dummy (which takes value one for treatments in which window-dressing is available and value zero otherwise). We use controls for gender and
summation skills as controls. These variables are defined as organizational levels averages.

As for Experiment 1 and in line with Hypothesis 1C, we find no significant differences between equal

PT

pay treatments in terms of organizational production. In line with Experiment 1, we also find that
organizational production was 14.0% greater under discrete pay than under equal pay in the absence of

CE

window-dressing activities (p-value = 0.076). By contrast, organizational production was 8.6% lower
under discrete pay than under equal pay in the presence of window-dressing (although the difference is
not statistically significant, p-value = 0.222).
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Our findings thus support the recommendation derived from the influence costs literature to give away
managerial discretion by setting an equal pay to all workers.

13
This is the p-value associated to the coefficient for the dummy of the discrete pay treatment with window-dressing in a probit panel regression with
random effects and robust standard errors in which the dependent variable takes value 1 if a manager allocates organizational production equally across
workers in a given period and value zero otherwise.
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6. Conclusion
We provided the first causal test of the negative effect of performance manipulation activities in an
organizational context. We showed that weakening incentives and limiting managerial discretion may be
optimal to deter performance manipulation. In particular, equal pay seemed to substantially reduce
window-dressing activities thus leading to higher organizational production than pay for performance.
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This was the case because the positive effect of equal pay on deterring window-dressing activities more
than offset its negative incentive effect. This echoes the theoretical literature on tournaments showing
that sabotage can be alleviated by reducing the gap between winning and losing prizes thus reducing the
strength of incentives (see e.g., Lazear, 1989). This prediction has been supported in a series of
laboratory experiments (Harbring and Irlenbush, 2004; 2005; 2011; Vandergrift and Yavas, 2010). The
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experimental literature in tournaments also suggests that giving workers the possibility to retaliate when
observing that others engage in window-dressing activities might deter such manipulation attempts
(Harbring et al., 2007; Vandergrift and Yavas, 2010).

In addition, our second experiment showed that performance manipulation could be reduced by
putting a manager in charge of both supervising and compensating workers. This was the case because,

M

thanks to their supervision technology, managers seemed to be able to detect and thus penalize excessive
performance manipulation. Furthermore, managers were able, thanks to their discretion over workers‘

performance manipulation.

ED

pay, to lessen the link between performance and pay thus limiting workers‘ incentives to engage in

PT

Even when managers were endowed with a supervision technology and full discretion over workers‘
pay, organizational production was still negatively affected by the availability of window-dressing

incentives.

CE

activities. This was the case because curbing window-dressing activities led managers to weaken

Managers may, however, not be willing to rely on equal pay to deter performance manipulation. This

AC

would be the case if managers intrinsically valued their decision rights (e.g., McClelland, 1975; Bartling
et al., 2014). This implies that, in the absence of inflexible bureaucratic rules, managers may voluntarily
leave the door open to manipulative attempts. In that case, it might be helpful to physically separate
employees and managers to limit influence activities. This separation might motivate the existence of
rigid hierarchical structures (see Lazear, 1989). This suggests future avenues of research assessing the
causal impact of multi-layer hierarchies and different structures of communication on the extent of
window-dressing activities within firms.
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An appealing alternative strategy to eradicate performance manipulation could be based on recruiting
workers who are less inclined to engage in influence activities. We show that such workers cannot be
identified using standard recruiting techniques based on personality traits and fluid intelligence. Instead,
we identify performance manipulators as being spiteful and reflective.
Because current recruiting methods emphasize fluid intelligence and because cognitive reflection
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correlates significantly and positively with fluid intelligence, firms may be inadvertently recruiting
potential manipulators in large numbers. This selection effect suggests window-dressing activities are
likely to be pervasive in actual firms. Thus, extending our analysis to profiling performance
manipulators within actual firms would be a crucial step in the research agenda.

AN
US

Appendix A: Performance manipulation model

Our model can be represented as a game with a pure strategy space represented as follows,
*

+ where

*

+

*

+ and

.

In Table A.1, we derive the optimal effort and window-dressing decisions for

in terms of

which all workers exert effort.

M

workers‘ cost levels across social motives and payment schemes. We consider efficient equilibria in

*

*
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Altruistic /
Spiteful

Observed-performance pay

CE

Selfish

Equal pay

PT

Payment
scheme
Social motive

ED

TABLE A.1—EFFICIENT EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS ACROSS WORKERS‘ SOCIAL MOTIVES WHEN

(

(

)

)

+

(

)

+

We now consider window-dressing equilibria. In our setting, these equilibria can only occur when
some workers exert effort whereas others do not. For this to happen, we consider that the population of
workers is divided into two types of workers. Low-ability workers are such that:
ability workers are such that:

and

and high-

denotes the number of high-ability workers in the

population. We derive the window-dressing equilibrium conditions below.
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TABLE A.2—WINDOW-DRESSING EQUILIBRIA CONDITIONS ACROSS WORKERS‘ ABILITY TYPES
Equal pay

Observed-performance pay

*

always
(
Altruistic /
Spiteful

)

(

{

always

+
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Payment
scheme
Social motive
Selfish

*

+

)

(

)

(

*

)

(

)

)
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(
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To derive Hypothesis 1A, we note that window-dressing equilibria may arise under observedperformance pay whereas they do not under equal-pay (see Table A.2). Under observed-performance

ED

pay, it follows that in the presence of window-dressing some workers (see low-ability workers in Table
A.2) could be rewarded although they have not produced output (

). This does not occur in the

PT

absence of window-dressing activities in which case workers are always paid according to their actual
contribution to the work task. Hypothesis 1B thus follows.

CE

Hypothesis 1C follows directly from the fact that ensuring workers‘ effort in equilibrium under equal
pay is unaffected by the presence of window-dressing activities (

) whereas under observed-

AC

performance pay the range of cost of effort values that implements the efficient equilibrium is smaller in
the absence of window-dressing activities (

) than in its presence. Indeed, in the presence of

window-dressing activities the upper bound on the worker‘s cost of effort ensuring the existence of an
efficient equilibrium is less than

(see right column in Table A.2).

Hypothesis 2A follows from the fact that under observed-performance pay the conditions for lowability workers to engage in window-dressing in equilibrium are less likely for large values of
Table A.2). This is the case because an increase in

(see

increases (decreases) the upper (lower) bound for

32

}

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

the cost of effort of high-ability (low-ability) workers that ensures a window-dressing equilibrium exists.
The intuition is that envious [altruistic] workers (

)[

] are less [more] likely to deviate from

the window-dressing equilibrium because it would most likely lead them to earn lower payoff than their
counterparts.
Note that for

, shame (

) also affects the conditions for the existence of a window-dressing
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equilibrium. We do not derive any conjecture on shame because it is found to matter in only specific
circumstances. In particular, a shameful low-ability worker might be less likely to deviate from the
window-dressing equilibrium by exerting effort in the case in which this effort generates output (with
probability

) whereas other low-ability workers‘ window-dressing attempts fail (with probability

).
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In line with Hypothesis 2B, it is also the case that window-dressing activities can only arise in
equilibrium when low-ability workers engage in them while high-ability workers decide to work on the
task. By contrast, it cannot be the case in equilibrium that high-ability workers engage in windowdressing while low-ability workers do not. The intuition is that deviating from the window-dressing
equilibrium is less costly for high-ability workers than for low-ability workers because they are more

ED

M

likely to secure a payment when exerting effort in the absence of window-dressing.

Appendix B: Additional tables and analyses

PT

EXPERIMENT 1

TABLE B.1—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WORKERS‘ PAY (IN CENTS)

AC

Intercept

CE

Dependent variable
Treatment

Period Trend
Performance

Gender Dummy (1 if female)
Observations (organizations)
R²

Workers‘ pay (per period) in cents
Observed-performance pay with window-dressing
79.14***
(19.76)
8.05
(6.09)
0.58***
(0.05)
8.46
(12.36)
n = 112 (28)
0.689

Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.

33

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

PT

ED

M

AN
US

CR
IP
T

TABLE B.2—PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WINDOW-DRESSING (IN SECONDS) AND WORKERS‘
PRODUCTION (IN CENTS) AS A FUNCTION OF A LARGE SET OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS
Dependent variable
Window-dressing
Production
393.84
-315.02
Intercept
(407.74)
(428.187)
50.71***
19.29
Period
(19.44)
(15.83)
Individual characteristics
Demographics
-46.95
1.64
Gender Dummy (1 if female)
(48.29)
(41.23)
16.01*
-6.43
Age (in years)
(8.82)
(9.42)
5.41
-7.62
Work experience
(17.33)
(14.39)
15.57
-17.02
Volunteering experience
(13.11)
(12.01)
Cognitive skills
-8.66***
19.87***
Summation Skills
(2.01)
(2.70)
-1.40
1.27
Raven test score
(8.18)
(7.93)
25.44***
-15.48***
Cognitive reflection test score
(7.08)
(5.95)
Personality & social motives
a
Big five personality traits
ns
-42.27
94.27
Intrinsic motivation score
(37.36)
(58.84)
-15.71**
13.65*
Prosocial index
(6.19)
(8.17)
Risk attitudes
-0.88
-2.92
Risk aversionb
(7.93)
(8.17)
Observations (organizations)
n = 112 (28)
n = 112 (28)
R²
0.317
0.546

AC

CE

Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.
a
Conscientiousness explains production significantly (p-value = 0.021) whereas the other four traits are not related to production.
b
Results are not affected by restricting our analysis to only the 46 (out of 56) participants who did not switch back and forth between the safer and the riskier
option in the Holt and Laury (2002) test.
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TABLE B.3—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WORKERS‘ PRODUCTION (IN CENTS) AND
WINDOW-DRESSING (IN SECONDS) AND A LARGE SET OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS
Dependent variable
Window-dressing
Production
258.75
249.88
-316.17
-323.17
Intercept
(402.55)
(393.44)
(411.23)
(421.87)
50.71***
50.71***
19.29
19.29
Period Trend
(19.44)
(19.44)
(15.83)
(15.83)
Individual characteristics
Demographics
-49.80
-40.96
8.22
3.03
Gender Dummy (1 if female)
(49.65)
(47.39)
(40.11)
(42.41)
15.21
16.39
-4.69
-7.13
Age (in years)
(9.48)
(8.84)
(9.85)
(9.81)
6.04
5.74
-8.89
-7.42
Work experience
(17.81)
(17.63)
(15.11)
(14.07)
14.37
17.21
-13.90
-18.93
Volunteering experience
(13.78)
(12.88)
(12.91)
(11.700)
Cognitive skills
-8.46***
-8.80***
19.95***
19.6***
Summation Skills
(2.04)
(1.88)
(2.63)
(2.67)
-2.94
-2.94
3.21
1.19
Raven test score
(7.95)
(7.95)
(7.52)
(7.88)
24.58***
24.08***
-17.09***
-12.49**
Cognitive reflection test score
(7.18)
(7.55)
(5.65)
(5.93)
Personality & social motives
a
b
Big five personality traits
ns
ns
-41.28
-46.35
88.86
99.38
Intrinsic motivation score
(38.61)
(38.91)
(55.99)
(61.09)
45.94*
-64.44**
Spiteful dummy
(29.09)
(30.26)
-43.72**
17.90
Altruism dummy
(17.88)
(36.55)
Risk attitudes
-1.77
-1.62
-1.63
-2.65
Risk aversionc
(7.48)
(7.82)
(7.58)
(7.61)
Observations (organizations)
n = 112 (28)
n = 112 (28)
n = 112 (28)
n = 112 (28)
R²
0.312
0.312
0.560
0.535

AC

Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.
a
Conscientiousness explains production significantly (p-value = 0.051) whereas the other four traits are not related to production.
b
Conscientiousness explains production significantly (p-value = 0.031) whereas the other four traits are not related to production.
c
Results are not affected by restricting our analysis to only the 46 (out of 56) participants who did not switch back and forth between the safer and the riskier
option in the Holt and Laury (2002) test.
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TABLE B.4—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WORKERS‘ PRODUCTION (IN CENTS) AND A
LARGE SET OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS

Observed-performance pay
(no window-dressing)
-132.87
(308.19)
46.98***
(14.83)

Treatment
Intercept
Period Trend

-8.18
(33.34)
5.18
(9.52)
6.72
(7.04)
5.56
(7.51)

Gender Dummy (1 if female)
Age
Work experience
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Volunteering experience
Cognitive skills

12.49***
(3.25)
-2.57
(4.79)
18.10***
(7.12)

Summation Skills
Raven test score
Cognitive reflection test score

M

Personality & social motives
Big five personality traits

Prosocial index

PT

Risk attitudes

Observations (organizations)
R²

-51.00
(20.20)
-4.28
(4.61)
3.60
(6.10)
-6.35
(5.91)

14.88***
(2.07)
2.64
(4.23)
7.01
(5.76)

ns
92.63***
(35.15)
-10.75
(7.53)

ns
67.11**
(30.84)
-8.22
(6.39)

7.63
(5.54)
n = 112 (28)
0.425

0.57
(4.53)
n = 112 (28)
0.505

ED

Intrinsic motivation score

Risk aversiona
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Individual characteristics
Demographics

Equal-pay
(both treatments)
-28.27
(211.68)
71.75***
(9.77)

AC

CE

Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.
a
Results are not affected by restricting our analysis to only the 46 (out of 56) participants who did not switch back and forth between the safer and the riskier
option in the Holt and Laury (2002) test.
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EXPERIMENT 2
TABLE B.5—FACTORIAL DESIGN
Number of

Payment Scheme

participants (organizations) [sessions]

Discrete Pay

Equal Pay

Absent

60 (15) [5]

60 (15) [5]

Activities

Present

64 (16) [5]

64 (16) [5]
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Window-dressing

In Table B.6, we provide additional robustness checks regarding the positive effect of detectable
window-dressing activities on agent pay. We define as detectable window-dressing activities those for
which:

AN
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[1] Agents boosted their production by an amount which was not a multiple of 30.
[2] Agents boosted their production by an excessive amount.

In particular, we define as excessive those window-dressing activities that led agents‘ production (as
observed by the principal) to be in the top 35% (25%) [20%] {10%} of agents‘ production levels in the
discrete pay treatment without influence: 540¢ (600¢) [660¢] {720¢}. These thresholds imply that the

M

respective proportions of undetectable window-dressing activities are 22.2%, 26.2%, 30.0% and 33.3%.
Our regression results (see Table B.6) are consistent with Table 5 showing that agents can increase
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their discrete pay by engaging in undetectable window-dressing activities.
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TABLE B.6—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSIONS ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF UNDETECTABLE WINDOW-DRESSING
ACTIVITIES ON DISCRETE PAY FOR THE TREATMENT WITH WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES AND DISCRETE PAY
Dependent variable
Workers‘ pay (per period) in cents
Undetectable window-dressing activities thresholds
Top 35%
Top 25%
Top 20%
Top 10%
540¢
600¢
660¢
720¢
21.296***
21.225***
21.704***
21.738**
Intercept
(2.999)
(3.015)
(2.938)
(2.921)
-0.027
-0.009
-0.001
-0.013
Period Trend
(0.049)
(0.059)
(0.029)
(0.035)
0.351***
0.351***
0.344***
0.345***
Actual contribution (%)
(0.094)
(0.094)
(0.094)
(0.095)

Undetectable Window4.294**
4.299**
1.953
2.030
Dressing Dummy
(2.195)
(2.118)
(1.370)
1.345
-0.044
-0.049
-0.050
-0.054
Summation Skills
(0.185)
(0.178)
(0.185)
(0.181)
Gender Dummy (1 if
-1.114
-1.119
-1.169
-1.167
female)
(2.039)
(2.108)
(2.176)
(2.160)
Observations
n = 240 (16)
n = 240 (16)
n = 240 (16)
n = 240 (16)
(organizations)
0.255
0.259
0.242
0.243
R²
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).



Significant at the 10 percent level (one-

M

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level;
sided test).

ED

TABLE B.7—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WORKERS‘ PAY (IN CENTS)
Treatment

No window-dressing

Window-dressing

104.00***
(33.88)
7.28***
(2.60)
0.58***
(0.07)

142.23***
(19.41)
13.44***
(3.15)
0.39***
(0.05)

Window dressing dummy ×
Performance

-

-

Window dressing dummy

-

-

-17.64
(19.62)
n = 225 (45)
0.668

5.60
(23.72)
n = 240 (48)
0.376

PT

Intercept

AC

Performance

CE

Period Trend

Gender Dummy
(1 if female)
Observations (organizations)
R²

Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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No window-dressing
& Window-dressing
94.44***
(33.19)
10.506***
(2.05)
0.57***
(0.06)
-0.17**
(0.07)
57.86
(38.93)
-5.14
(15.53)
n = 465 (93)
0.549
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